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The present study extends earlier research by presenting the results of a new 
and updated version of the RICE model (Regional Integrated model of 
Climate and the Economy), labeled the RICE-2009 model. The model is a 
regionalized, dynamic model that incorporates an end-to-end treatment of 
economic growth, emissions, climate change, damages, and emissions 
controls. The model allows projections of what will occur with no policies, 
with efficient policies be, how nations can undertake policies to limit climate 
change (in the current runs to 2 °C), and the impacts of limited participation. 
These new estimates indicate that coordinated international policies have a 
substantial economic benefit. The optimal carbon tax is estimated to be $29 
per ton carbon ($8 per ton CO2) for 2010 in 2005 prices. The economic 
optimum would limit global temperature rise to an average of 2.5 °C over 
1900 levels for the 22nd and 23rd century. 
  
                                                 
1 This research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the Department of 
Energy, the Glaser Foundation, and particularly by Yale University. The author is grateful 
for research assistance of Xi Chen and Mark Longhurst. Comments and suggestions from 
colleagues, especially Zili Yang, have been essential to the improvements in the models. 
This version reflect RICE model RICE-2009.beta.082509. This analysis supercedes the earlier 
working paper dated July 30, 2009. The main difference is that the earlier version used a 
different scaling procedure for combining countries. 
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  The economics of global warming has become particularly salient with 
the engagement of the Obama Administration with proposals to undertake 
sharp cuts in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The present study extends 
earlier research by presenting the results of a new and updated version of the 
RICE model (Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy), 
labeled the RICE-2009 model. The model is a regionalized, dynamic model 
that incorporates an end-to-end treatment of economic growth, emissions, 
climate change, damages, and emissions controls. The model allows 
projections of what will occur with no policies, with an efficient set of 
policies, with policies to limit climate change (in the current runs to 2 °C), 
and with limited participation. 
 
I.  The RICE-2009 Model  
 
I begin with a succinct description of the RICE model, beginning with 
the economic sectors and then discussing the geophysical sectors.2  
 
The approach used here is to view climate change in the framework of 
economic growth theory. In the optimal growth model, or Ramsey model, 
society invests in tangible capital goods, thereby abstaining from 
consumption today, in order to increase consumption in the future (Ramsey 
1928, Koopmans 1965). The DICE/RICE models are the extension of the 
Ramsey model to include climate investments. The capital stock of the 
conventional neoclassical growth model is extended to include investments 
in the environment. Emissions reductions in the extended model are 
analogous to investment in the mainstream model. That is, we can view 
concentrations of GHGs as “negative natural capital,” and emissions 
reductions as lowering the quantity of negative natural capital. Emissions 
reductions lower consumption today but prevent economically harmful 
climate change and thereby increase consumption possibilities in the future. 
 
The world is divided into 12 regions. Some are large countries (such as 
the U.S. or China); others are large regions (like the European Union or Latin 
                                                 
2 The model is available as an Excel spreadsheet on the author’s web page at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/DICE2007.htm. These results are 
based on the “beta” version as of August 25, 2009. 
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 America). Each region is assumed to have a well-defined set of preferences, 
represented by a social welfare function, which optimizes that regions 
consumption, greenhouse gas policies, and investment over time. The social 
welfare function is increasing in the per capita consumption of each 
generation, with diminishing marginal utility of consumption. The 
importance of a generation’s per capita consumption depends on its relative 
size. The relative importance of different generations is measured using a 
pure rate of time preference, and the shape of the utility function is given by 
the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. These parameters are 
calibrated to ensure that the model real interest rate is close to the average 
real interest rate in real-world markets (Nordhaus 1994, IPCC Second 
Assessment, Economics 1995). 
 
The model contains both a traditional economic sector found in many 
economic models and geophysical relationships designed for climate-change 
modeling. We first describe the traditional sector of the economy — the 
economy without any considerations of climate change.  
 
A. Economic sectors 
 
Each country or region is assumed to produce a single commodity 
which can be used for either consumption or investment. Each region is 
endowed with an initial stock of capital and labor and with an initial and 
region-specific level of technology. Population data are from United Nations 
2004 updated with more recent estimates through 2008. Output estimates are 
purchasing power parity in 2005 U.S. international prices from the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund and are through 2008 with 
projections to 2014. CO2 emissions are from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration and are generally through 2006.  
 
Population growth and technological change are exogenous in the 
baseline model, while capital accumulation is determined by optimizing the 
flow of consumption over time. Output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function in capital, labor, and carbon-energy inputs. 
Technological change takes two forms: economy-wide technological change 
and carbon-energy-saving technological change. Economy-wide 
technological change is Hicks neutral, while energy-saving technological 
change is modeled as reducing the ratio of CO2 emissions to carbon-energy 
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 inputs. Technological change is projected for a frontier region (the U.S.), and 
other countries are assumed to have partial convergence to the frontier. For 
convenience, both carbon-energy and industrial emissions are measured in 
the same units of carbon weight (Nordhaus 1994, Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). 
 
We calibrate the energy-related parameters using data on historical 
and projected GDP and CO2 emissions, and particularly the CO2-GDP ratio 
by region. We specify a cost function for CO2 emissions reductions that is 
drawn from more detailed models at the national and regional levels from 
IPCC Fourth Assessment, Mitigation 2007. Additionally, there is a backstop 
technology which can replace all carbon fuels at a relatively high price ($1200 
per ton C, declining over time, drawn from IPCC Carbon Capture 2001 and 
other sources). The supply curve allows for limited (albeit huge) long-run 
supplies of carbon fuels. Because of the optimal-growth framework, 
emissions are efficiently allocated across time, which implies that low-cost 
carbon resources have scarcity prices (called “Hotelling rents”) and that 
carbon-energy prices rise over time (Hotelling 1931). 
 
Solution of a multi-country general-economic equilibrium model poses 
major modeling issues (see Rutherford 2009). We have used a modification of 
the Negishi procedure introduced in Nordhaus and Yang 1996. The 
modification is that the welfare weights are set to equalize the period-by-
period marginal utilities using the weighted average marginal utility, where 
the region-period weights are the region’s share of the global capital stock.  
 
B. Geophysical sectors 
 
The geophysical part of the model contains a number of geophysical 
relationships that link together the different forces affecting climate change. 
This part contains a carbon cycle, a radiative forcing equation, climate-
change equations, a climate-damage relationship, and a new sea-level rise 
module. 
  
In the current vintage of models, endogenous emissions are limited to 
industrial CO2. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are now outside the climate-
change control strategy. Other contributions to global warming are taken as 
exogenous. These include CO2 emissions from land-use changes, non-CO2 
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 greenhouse gases, and sulfate aerosols (Hansen et al. 2006, IPCC Fourth 
Assessment, Science 2007). 
 
 The model uses a three-reservoir model calibrated to existing carbon-
cycle models to calculate the carbon cycle. Climate change is represented by 
global mean surface temperature, and the relationship uses the results of the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC to estimate the lag structure and the 
equilibrium (IPCC Fourth Assessment, Science 2007). The current version 
assumes that the equilibrium temperature-sensitivity coefficient is 3 °C per 
CO2 doubling. The model has also been checked by comparing results with 
those of MAGICC 2009. 
 
Understanding the economic impacts of climate change continues to be 
the thorniest issue in climate-change economics. The estimates of damages 
come from Nordhaus 2007. It assumes that the damage-output ratio is a 
quadratic function of global temperature increase. The damage ratio is 2.6 
percent global output at a 3 °C increase and 10.2 percent at a 6 °C increase.  
 
The current version of the RICE-2009 model does not differentiate the 
damage functions by regions because of the uncertainties associated with the 
damage estimates. We plan to introduce region-specific change functions in 
the next version.  
  
There have been many recent studies concerned with abrupt and 
catastrophic climate change (Oppenheimer 1998, National Research Council, 
Committee on Abrupt Climate Change 2002, Oppenheimer and Alley 2004). 
Estimates for the economic costs of abrupt and catastrophic climate change 
are included in the damage estimates in the RICE model, but the model does 
not build in a precise tipping point at a given temperature increase because 
that has not be reliably determined. 
 
C. Sea-level Rise 
 
The RICE-2009 model contains a new module with calculations of sea-
level rise (SLR).3 This experimental model contains estimates of the SLR 
                                                 
3 The derivation of the SLR module as well as a spreadsheet showing the calculations are 
available on the author’s web page at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/DICE2007.htm.  
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 associated with different temperature trajectories. The SLR module has five 
sources: thermal expansion, small glaciers, Greenland Ice Sheet, West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet, and Other Antarctic Ice Sheet. The first two of these are 
relatively well modeled in current AOGCMs, while the latter three are 
subject to major uncertainties.  
 
The model begins with the SLR-equivalent ice in each of the five 
components. Thermal expansion is a function of the temperature of the 
upper level of the oceans. For the ice sheets and glaciers, we assume a 
minimum melt threshold and a linear melt rate as a function of the difference 
between global mean temperature and the melt threshold. 
 
Thermal expansion has been calibrated to both short-run and long-run 
model results of OAGCMs and is reasonably consistent with those. Estimates 
for the GIS are consistent with the model runs in AR4. The estimates for the 
WAIS are more speculative but are consistent with the consensus rather than 
the pessimistic views of the potential for disintegration of the WAIS. The 
details of the SLR module will be provided in an associated study. 
 
 
II.  Policy Scenarios 
 
In the runs developed here, we present four alternatives: 
 
1.  Baseline: No climate change policies. 
2.  Optimal: Climate change policies maximize economic welfare with 
no participation or other constraints. 
3.  Limit temperature to 2 °C: The optimal policies are taken subject to 
a constraint that global temperature would not increase more than 2 
°C above the 1900 average. This run is of interest because it has 
been widely supported by environmental activists. 
4.  Optimization with limited participation: A final run examines a 
cost-beneficial policy such as in 2 in which realistic timetables are 
placed for the participation of middle-income and developing 
countries. 
 
The baseline can be interpreted as complete inaction and stalemate on 
climate policy. In this scenario, there are no climate policies. However, it is 
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 assumed that a zero-carbon backstop technology becomes competitive with 
current technologies in 2250, so emissions after that time are zero. The 
Optimal run provides the most efficient, or best possible, climate-change 
policies; in this context, efficient involves a balancing of costs of abatement 
and benefits of reduced climate damages. While it is unrealistic, it provides 
an economic benchmark against which other policies can be measured. The 
Limit policy is a variant of the Optimal which builds in a precautionary 
constraint that a specific temperature increase cannot be exceeded. 
 
The limited-participation run reflects the likely reality that low-income 
countries will be relatively slow to participate in a global-warming regime. 
Table 1 shows the assumed year in which each region is assumed to join and 
the fraction of the emissions of that region which is assumed to be covered in 
















Non-Russian Eurasia 0.75 2010
China 0.75 2040
India 0.60 2050
Middle East 0.50 2050
Africa 0.50 2080
Latin America 0.80 2040
Other High Income 0.90 2010
Other Asia 0.60 2050





III.  Major Results 
 
A. The major cases 
 
There are too many results to report comprehensively on the estimates. 




The major results for the model are shown in Figures 1 through 12. 
Figure 1 shows the emissions under the four policies. Unrestrained emissions 
are estimated to grow very rapidly. Emissions under the optimal and 
temperature-limited paths are essentially flat for the next two to six decades 
and then decline after that. The optimal path finds a cut in global emissions 
of 50 percent from 2005 in 100 years, while the 2 °C temperature limit path 
prescribes zero emissions at about 2085.  
 
Note that these are global figures. Proposals before the international 
community relate only to high-income countries and are substantially 
smaller on a global level. For example, if high-income countries reduce their 
emissions to zero in 2035 but no measures are taken in other countries, the 
RICE model indicates that the global temperature increase will peak at 5.3 °C 
rather than 6.2 °C in the baseline case 
 
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 rise sharply under the baseline 
path, reaching 760 ppm by 2100 (see Figure 2). The two control paths have 
some slight continuation in the rise of concentrations from current levels, 
peaking between 500 and 600 ppm. (Note these refer to CO2, not to CO2-
equivalent.) Radiative forcings shown in Figure 3 (which do include non-CO2 
GHGs) peak at 4.3 W/m2 in the optimal path and at 3.4 W/m2 in the 
temperature-limit path. 
 
Global temperature projections, shown in Figure 4, rise sharply under 
the baseline, reaching 3.3 °C in 2100, 5.3 °C in 2200 and peaks at 6.2 °C (all 
relative to 1900). The other two paths rise for the early 21st century because of 
the momentum of past emissions. They then bend down as emissions 
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 reductions take place, peaking at 2 °C (obviously) for the temperature limit 
path and 2.7 °C for the optimal path. One important point to note is that the 
optimal path has a relatively low maximum temperature, and that the 
temperature increase averaged over the 2100-2300 period for the optimal case 
is 2.4 °C.  
 
Figures 5 and 6 as well as Table 2 show the carbon prices in the 
different runs. The baseline carbon prices (which are the Hotelling rents on 
carbon fuels) are essentially zero. The optimal and temperature-limit prices 
start at $29 to $42 per ton carbon for 2010 in 2005 prices. The optimal prices 
grow sharply until they reach the projected backstop price. Note that the 
limited-participation run has only a slightly higher optimal carbon price 
because the marginal damages are only marginally higher with limited 
participation.  
 
Figures 7 and 8 show the projected SLR. These are tentative at this 
point because they have not been compared with other integrated assessment 
models, although they have been compared with AOGCMs. Figure 7 shows 
that SLR in the base case is projected to be 0.65 meters from 1900 to 2100. The 
projection for 2200 is 1.6 meters – with about one-half of that coming from 
thermal expansion and the balance from the large ice sheets. Figure 8 
compares the different policies. Any of the three policy runs limit SLR 
substantially because they keep the temperature rise under 3 °C. The two 
policy cases have projected SLR around 0.8 meters between 1900 and 2200. 
 
Table 3 shows the stakes involved in the overall costs and benefits of a 
global warming program. Using our model discount rates, the optimal 
program raises the present value of world income by $2.46 trillion, or 0.16 
percent of discounted income. This is the equivalent to an annuity of $12 
billion per year. Note that in the optimal case, adding the constraint of 2 °C is 
relatively inexpensive, costing a present value of $1.10 trillion. Limited 
participation in the optimal case reduces the benefits by $0.73 trillion. Note 
that these are not additive factors, however, because a rigid target plus 




 B.  Comparison with earlier results 
 
It will be useful as well as humbling to compare the current round of 
results with earlier RICE/DICE models. These models have almost two 
decades of track record, with major revisions in science, economics, 
modeling, and software along the way (Nordhaus 1994, Nordhaus and Yang 
1996, Nordhaus and Boyer 2000, Nordhaus 2007).  
 
Figure 9 shows the projected global temperature increase for the next 
century. While the estimates have varied, the latest estimate is actually 
relatively close to the estimates in the Nordhaus 1994 model. The model’s 
geophysics is relatively stable. 
 
Figure 10 shows the calculated optimal carbon price. The numbers are 
corrected for inflation but not for other changes in the models or projections. 
The near-term estimates are similar to those in the last round while the 
longer term estimates are considerably higher. There are several reasons for 
the upward revisions. Some are technical issues, such as moving to PPP 
exchange rates (see Nordhaus 2007, 2007a). Others come from the 
“stagnationist” assumptions about output in earlier rounds. Additionally, 
there have been major upward revisions in the projected emissions path of 
developing countries, particularly China and India. The increase in the long-
horizon prices is due to a much more rapid growth in global output. (Some 
of these were reviewed in detail in Nordhaus 2007.)  
 
C. A warning about Panglossianism 
 
We discussed above the importance of global participation in any 
climate-control program. This point is also emphasized by an examination of 
abatement costs. One of the advantages of the RICE model is that it can show 
regional costs as well as global costs. Figure 11 shows the estimated 
abatement costs under the optimal program for several regions. The costs rise 
sharply over time under the optimal program. The most heavily burdened 
regions are China and United States, while Japan is relatively lightly 
burdened.  
 
We can also see the difficulty involved in implementing a global 
program by examining the sum of abatement costs of middle- and low-
10 
 income countries (these comprise countries outside Japan, the US, the EU, 
Russia, and other high income countries). Suppose that high income 
countries endeavored to compensate developing countries for their 
abatement costs in the optimal program. As shown by the upper line in 
Figure 12, these costs would be relatively modest in the near-term decades, 
but rise to $150 billion per year by mid-21st century. The questionable 
political feasibility of these large transfers suggests either that climate control 
programs will be limited to incomplete participation (with the unhappy 
results discussed above) or that a consensus among poorer countries will 
need to develop rapidly in the near future. Figure 12 also shows the 
abatement costs of the non-participants (non-Annex I) countries under the 
limited-participation runs. While abatement costs are relatively small in the 
early years, they become substantial as countries join the abatement regime. 
 
This point emphasizes that the “optimal” and even the “limits” runs 
analyzed here are somewhere between optimistic and Panglossian. They 
assume a well-managed world, globally designed environmental policies, 
with all countries contributing, with decision makers looking both to the best 
geosciences and to sound economic policies, and with rich countries bringing 
the poor, the unenthusiastic, and the laggard along sufficient with carrots 
and sticks to ensure that all are onboard with no free riding. Human history 
suggests that this is an unlikely political environment. Where the actual 
outcomes will lie between the optimistic optimum and the fatalistic baseline 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 10. Estimated efficient carbon prices 


















































































































Figure 12. Abatement costs by region in optimal and  








 (2005 prices per ton C)
Carbon prices 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2055 2105
Optimal 0.00 29.33 35.09 41.98 50.23 123.74 364.79
Limit T < 2 °C  0.00 42.17 53.60 68.13 86.60 344.59 854.59
Limited participation 0.00 30.09 35.95 42.96 51.34 125.66 370.31
(2005 prices per ton CO2)
Carbon prices  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2025 2025
Optimal 0.00 8.00 9.57 11.45 13.70 33.75 99.51
Limit T < 2 °C  0.00 11.50 14.62 18.59 23.62 94.00 233.11
Limited participation 0.00 8.21 9.81 11.72 14.00 34.28 101.01
 (2009 prices per ton C)
Carbon prices 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2055 2105
Optimal 0.00 32.26 38.60 46.18 55.26 136.11 401.27
Limit T < 2 °C  0.00 46.39 58.97 74.95 95.26 379.05 940.05
Limited participation 0.00 33.10 39.55 47.26 56.48 138.22 407.34
 (2009 prices per ton CO2)
Carbon prices 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2055 2105
Optimal 0.00 8.80 10.53 12.60 15.07 37.13 109.46
Limit T < 2 °C  0.00 12.65 16.08 20.44 25.99 103.40 256.42
Limited participation 0.00 9.03 10.79 12.89 15.41 37.70 111.11























Base 1,577.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Optimal 1,579.4 2.46 0.16 12.32 0.16
Limited participation 1,578.7 1.74 0.11 8.68 0.11
Limit T < 2 °C  1,578.3 1.36 0.09 6.81 0.09
 
* Annual value of consumption at discount rate of 5 percent per year. 
 
 
Table 3. Present value of consumption, different policies (scaled to 2005 US 
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